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 1 
Introduction 
The object of this paper is to analyse the economic implications of the rise of China, 
India, Brazil and South Africa, situated in the wider context of the world economy. The 
structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 sketches a profile of China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa in the world economy. It sets the stage by outlining the broad contours 
of their significance in the past, present and future. Section 2 asks whether these 
countries could be the new engines of growth for the world, beginning with history and 
statistics to touch upon the underlying economic causation. Section 3 examines the 
possible impact of rapid growth in the four economies on the world economy, the 
industrialized countries and the developing countries. Section 4 considers the main 
forms of engagement and channels of interaction for these countries with the world 
economy, with a focus on international trade, international investment, international 
finance and international migration. Section 5 discusses the potential influence of 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa on institutions in the global context, which would 
obviously extend beyond economics into politics and range from bilateralism through 
plurilateralism to multilateralism. 
1  China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the world economy 
The significance of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa (CIBS) in the global context 
has changed over time. The discussion in this section provides a historical perspective 
of the past, a snapshot picture of the present and an extrapolated scenario of the future.  
1.1 The  past 
The emerging significance of China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the world 
economy must be situated in historical perspective. Table 1, which is based on estimates 
made by Angus Maddison, presents evidence on the shares of China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa in world population and in world income for selected years during the 
period from 1820 to 2001. It shows that, in 1820, China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
accounted for 57 per cent of world population and almost 50 per cent of world income. 
There was a dramatic change in the next 150 years. In 1973, the share of China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa in world population was significantly lower at about 40 per cent 
but their share in world income collapsed to less than 11 per cent, which was a small 
fraction of what it was 150 years earlier. The next thirty years witnessed some recovery. 
While the share of China, India, Brazil and South Africa in world population remained 
in the range of 40 per cent, their share in world income rose to almost 21 per cent in 
2001. These aggregates reveal the essential contours, but also conceal some aspects of 
the story. There are similarities between China and India, just as there are similarities 
between Brazil and South Africa. But there are significant differences between the two 
sets of countries. For much of the time, China and India had dominant shares.1  
 
                                                 
1   The dominance was even greater earlier. During the period from 1000 to 1700, China and India, taken 
together, accounted for 50 per cent of world population and 50 per cent of world income. And, two 
thousand years ago, in 1 AD, China and India accounted for almost 60 per cent of world population 
and world income. For a more detailed discussion, see Nayyar (2008a). 2 
Table 1 
China India, Brazil and South Africa in the world economy  
Share in world population and world GDP, 1820-2001 
Year China  India  Brazil  South  Africa 
  Percentage share of world population 
1820  36.6  19.9 0.4 0.1 
1870  28.1  17.0 0.8 0.2 
1913  24.4  14.2 1.3 0.3 
1950  21.7  14.8 2.1 0.5 
1973  22.5  14.8 2.6 0.6 
2001  20.7  16.5 2.9 0.7 
  Percentage share of world income 
1820  32.9  16.0 0.4 0.1 
1870  17.1  12.1 0.6 0.2 
1913  8.8 7.5 0.7 0.4 
1950  4.5 4.2 1.7 0.6 
1973  4.6 3.1 2.5 0.6 
2001  12.3 5.4 2.7 0.5 
Note:   The percentages in this table have been calculated from estimates of population and GDP in 
Maddison (2003). The data on GDP are in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, which are 
purchasing power parities used to evaluate output that are calculated based on a specific 
method devised to define international prices. This measure facilitates inter-country comparisons 
over time.  
Source:   Maddison (2003). 
Beginning in 1820, the share of China and India in world population declined steadily 
until 1973 but, over the same period, the decline in their share of world income was 
much more pronounced. Consequently, during the period from 1820 to 1973, there was 
a sharp increase in the asymmetries, or disproportionalities, between the shares of China 
and India in world population and in world income. The partial recovery in their share 
of world income during the period from 1973 to 2001 has reduced the asymmetry but 
the disproportionality remains significant. For much of the time, the shares of Brazil and 
South Africa were far smaller. But there were also other important differences. For one, 
the shares of Brazil and South Africa in world population and in world income 
increased, even if slowly for some of the time, throughout this period. For another, the 
shares of Brazil and South Africa in world population and in world income were 
symmetrical and proportional throughout this period.  
1.2 The  present 
It is possible to juxtapose this past with the present. Table 2 outlines a profile of GDP, 
population and GDP per capita in China, India, Brazil and South Africa as compared 
with developing countries, industrialized countries and the world, in 2000 and 2005. It 
shows that the population of the world is more than six billion, of which a little less than 
one billion is in the industrialized countries, somewhat more than five billion is in the 
developing countries and more than 2.5 billion is in China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa. Thus, 40 per cent of the population in the world and 50 per cent of the 
population in developing countries lives in China, India, Brazil and South Africa.   
There are two sets of figures on GDP and GDP per capita: at constant prices with 
market exchange rates and in terms of purchasing power parities. Consider each in turn.  
 3 
Table 2 
GDP, population and GDP per capita 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa, 2000 and 2005 
 GDP    Population    PPP-GDP 
  ($ billion)  ($ per capita)   (million)    ($ billion)  ($ per capita)
Country  2000 2005 2000 2005  2000 2005  2000 2005 2000 2005 
China  1198 1890 949 1449 1263 1305 4973 7842 3939 6012
India  460  644 453 588 1016 1095 2402 3362 2364 3072
Brazil  602  670 3461 3597 174 186 1251 1393 7193 7475
South  Africa  133  160 3020 3406 44 47 386  463 8764 9884
        
Total above  2393  3364 2496 2632 9011  13061   
        
Developing  countries  6058 7813 1191 1440 5085 5427 18818  25322 3701 4666
(CIBS as % of)  (39.5)  (43.1) (49.1) (48.5) (47.9) (51.6)   
                
Industrialized countries  24542  27148 27304 29251 899 928 25157 27898 27988 30058
World  31756  36352 5241 5647 6060 6438 45144  54573 7450 8477
(CIBS as % of)  (7.5)  (9.3) (41.2) (40.9) (20.0) (23.9)   
Notes:  GDP and GDP per capita are measured in constant 2000 US dollars;  
  PPP-GDP and PPP-GDP per capita are measured in constant 2000 international dollars. 
Source:   World Bank (2007). 
At market exchange rates, between 2000 and 2005, the share of China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa increased from 7 per cent to 9 per cent of world GDP and from 39 per cent 
to 43 per cent of GDP in developing countries. Over the same period, at market 
exchange rates, GDP per capita in China was about the same, GDP per capita for India 
was less than half, while GDP per capita in Brazil and South Africa was more than 
double the average GDP per capita in developing countries. It is worth noting that 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa are far below GDP per capita in the industrialized 
countries and significantly below GDP per capita in the world as a whole. The picture is 
somewhat different if the comparison is in terms of purchasing power parities. Between 
2000 and 2005, the share of China, India, Brazil and South Africa increased from 20 per 
cent to 24 per cent of world PPP-GDP and from 48 per cent to 52 per cent of the PPP-
GDP of developing countries. It would seem that, for China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, taken together, these shares in world income are now much more symmetrical 
with their share in world population. Over the same period, in PPP terms, GDP per 
capita in China moved ahead of GDP per capita in developing countries, whereas GDP 
per capita in India was about two-thirds of GDP per capita in developing countries. In 
contrast, GDP per capita in Brazil and South Africa was more than double the GDP per 
capita in developing countries and close to the world average. 
This snapshot picture situates China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the world 
economy at the present conjuncture. But the observed reality has been shaped by their 
economic performance in the past. Table 3 sets out rates of growth in GDP and GDP per 
capita, during the period 1951-80 and 1981-2005 for China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, in comparison with regions within the developing world, the developing 
countries, the industrialized countries and the world economy.2  
                                                 
2   The evidence in Table 3, and the discussion that follows, draws upon earlier work of the author. See 
Nayyar (2008b). 4 
The figures for the period 1951-80 are based on Maddison data because United Nations 
data are not available before 1971. The figures for the period 1981-2005 are based on 
United Nations data because Maddison data are not available after 2001. These two 
sources are not strictly comparable. For the period 1981-2000, however, data are 
available from both sources. To facilitate a comparison, Table 3 also presents figures on 
growth rates, during 1981-2000, computed separately from Maddison data and United 
Nations data. A comparison of the two sets of growth rates, during the period   
1981-2000 for which both sources are available, shows that the numbers correspond 
closely, although there are significant differences in the figures for China where UN 
data suggest much higher growth rates than Maddison data. Even so, it is reasonable to 
infer that the growth rates for the periods 1951-80 and 1981-2005, even if computed 
from different sources, are comparable, with the exception of China for which some 
downward adjustment may be needed.  
Table 3 
Growth performance of China, India, Brazil and South Africa, 1951-80 and 1981-2005 
comparison with regions and country-groups (% per annum) 
  Maddison data    United Nations data 
 1951-80  1981-2000    1981-2000  1981-2005 
 GDP 
China 5.03  7.36    9.80  9.73 
India 3.57  5.68    5.54  5.79 
Brazil 6.78  2.14    2.00  2.04 
South Africa  4.48 1.54    1.63  2.01 
Asia 6.28  4.04    3.90  4.06 
Latin America  4.69 2.01    2.09  2.26 
Africa 4.12  2.42    2.60  2.97 
Developing countries  4.84 2.65    2.74  3.04 
Industrialized countries 4.40  2.56    2.59  2.50 
World 4.77  2.64    2.72  2.95 
  GDP per capita 
China 3.01  6.01    8.46  8.51 
India 1.40  3.62    3.50  3.83 
Brazil 3.85  0.33    0.22  0.33 
South Africa  1.85  -0.29   -0.63  0.04 
Asia 2.90  1.61    1.36  1.63 
Latin America  2.11 0.15    0.20  0.44 
Africa 1.66  -0.17    -0.06  0.39 
Developing countries  2.19 0.39    0.42  0.80 
Industrialized countries 3.50  2.04    2.06  1.96 
World 2.40  0.66    0.69  0.99 
Notes:  (a)  The growth rates for each period are computed as geometric means of the annual growth 
rates in that period; 
  (b)   The Maddison data and the United Nations data on GDP and GDP per capita are not strictly  
comparable; 
  (c)  The Maddison data on GDP and GDP per capita, which are in 1990 international Geary– 
Khamis dollars, are purchasing power parities used to evaluate output which are calculated 
based on a specific method devised to define international prices. This measure facilitates 
inter-country comparisons; 
  (d)   The United Nations data on GDP and GDP per capita are in constant 1990 US dollars; 
  (e)   The figures in this table for the world economy cover 128 countries, of which 21 are 
industrialized countries and 107 are developing countries; 
  (f)   Latin America includes the Caribbean. 
Sources:  Maddison (2003), United Nations (2006a, 2006b). 
 5 
A study of Table 3 clearly shows that growth in GDP and GDP per capita during 
1981-2005 was much slower than it was during 1951-80. This was so for the world 
economy, for industrialized countries and for developing countries. Growth in GDP was 
in the range 4-5 per cent per annum during 1951-80 and in the range of 2-3 per cent per 
annum during 1981-2005 almost everywhere, except Asia where it was 6 per cent and 
4  per cent per annum, respectively. Growth in GDP per capita slowed down 
considerably even in the industrialized countries, from 3.5 per cent per annum to 2 per 
cent per annum, but the slowdown was more pronounced for developing countries, from 
2.2 per cent per annum to 0.8 per cent per annum. In Latin America and Africa, during 
1981-2005, growth in GDP per capita was less than 0.5 per cent per annum, while Asia 
fared better at more than 1.5 per cent per annum. 
The economic performance of China, Brazil and South Africa presents a mixed picture, 
which does not quite conform to the trends observed in the aggregate. The most striking 
contrast is that China and India were the clear exceptions to this worldwide slowdown 
in growth. In both countries, growth rates in the second period were much higher than 
the perfectly respectable growth rates in the first period. So much so that, between 
1951-80 and 1981-2005, average annual growth in GDP per capita almost trebled in 
both China and India. This was attributable in part to higher GDP growth rates and in 
part to lower population growth rates. Unlike China and India, however, Brazil and 
South Africa were a part of the worldwide slowdown in growth. In both countries, 
growth rates in the second period were much lower than the impressive growth rates in 
the first period. So much so that, during 1981-2005, average annual growth in GDP per 
capita was almost negligible in both Brazil and South Africa. But it is also worth noting 
that, during 1951-80, average annual growth in GDP and GDP per capita in Brazil was 
significantly higher than that in China and India. The growth performance of South 
Africa during 1951-80 was also better than that of India although it did not quite match 
that of China. 
It might also be worth comparing the growth performance of China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa with the growth performance of other latecomers to industrialization at 
comparable stages of development. Figure 1 attempts such a comparison. It shows the 
GDP growth trajectories in China starting 1979, India starting 1980, Brazil starting 
1964, South Africa starting 1980, Korea starting 1965, and Japan starting 1960. The 
selected years coincide, as far as possible, with points in time when rapid economic 
growth began in these countries. In Japan, rapid growth started around the mid-1950s 
but comparable data for the period before 1960 are not available. In South Africa, it is 
not possible to discern any turning point in economic growth. It is worth noting that, in 
Figure 1, the year of origin for each country is different, which makes it possible to 
compare their growth trajectories at similar stages of development. It would seem that 
China’s growth performance is discernibly better while India’s growth performance is 
roughly comparable with that of Japan and Korea. Brazil’s growth performance, until 
about 1980, was also broadly comparable with that of Japan and Korea at similar stages 
but lagged behind thereafter. South Africa, it would seem, is the exception in so far as 
its growth performance is simply not comparable with that of other latecomers to 
industrialization. Interestingly enough, a comparison of growth in exports of goods and 
services, in Figure 2, reveals that export performance in China beginning 1979, in India 
beginning 1980 and in Brazil beginning 1964 but only until 1980, was roughly 
comparable with that in Japan beginning 1960 and Korea beginning 1965, although 
export growth in Japan and Korea was discernibly higher in the first decade. Once 
again, South Africa does not fit into this picture. 6 
Figure 1 
GDP growth trajectories in China, India, Brazil and South Africa 















































































































Export growth in China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
compared with Japan and Korea 
Source: World Bank (2007). 7 
1.3 The  future 
Most growth scenarios for the future are based on an extrapolation of growth from the 
past. In attempting such projections, most exercises assume that growth rates in China 
and India, as also in the industrialized countries, would remain at levels observed in the 
recent past, while growth rates in Brazil would step up once again. Of course, it is 
Russia, rather than South Africa, that is an integral part of projections for, and scenarios 
in, 2050. And even if South Africa has some potential, it is not yet on a trajectory of 
rapid economic growth. 
The construction of future scenarios began with the Goldman Sachs study which 
attempted to project levels of GDP and GDP per capita for Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (BRICs) in 2050.3 The exercise is based on a simple model of capital 
accumulation and productivity growth combined with demographic projections. The 
broad conclusions of the study are as follows.4 In 2000, the GDP of these four 
economies was less than 15 per cent of the GDP of the G-6: US, Japan, Germany, UK, 
France and Italy. By 2025, in terms of GDP, the BRICs would be more than 50 per cent 
of the G-6. And, in 2040, the BRICs economies together would have a larger GDP than 
the G-6. In terms of GDP, each of the BRICs economies would overtake each of these 
G-6 economies, except the US, by 2040. And, by 2050, of the G-6, only the US and 
Japan would remain among the six largest economies in the world. It is estimated that 
about two-thirds of the increase in GDP of the BRICs, measured in US dollars, would 
come from real growth while the remaining one-third would be attributable to currency 
appreciation. The catch-up of BRICs is expected to be most dramatic until 2030. 
Thereafter, growth in BRICs would also slow down and only India might have growth 
rates higher than 3 per cent per annum in 2050. The catch-up would be less in terms of 
GDP per capita. On average, with the exception of Russia, citizens in the BRICs are 
likely to be poorer than citizens in the G-6. It needs to be stressed that the projected 
growth path for the BRICs, even in the Goldman Sachs study, depends on critical 
assumptions about policies and institutions, as also the capacities of these countries to 
resolve their problems, so that outcomes are neither predictable nor certain.5 
In a more sophisticated exercise for China and India, that uses simple convergence 
equations, Robert Rowthorn (2006) projects that, in 2050, at purchasing power parity, 
per capita income in China would be 63 per cent of per capita income in the United 
States, while per capita income in India would be 45 per cent of per capita income in the 
United States. It is also projected that both China and India should comfortably overtake 
the United States in GDP measured at purchasing power parity. This catch-up is not 
confined to PPP-GDP comparisons. The Rowthorn projections show that, even at 
market exchange rates, by 2050, total output in China would be 60 per cent larger than 
in the US, while total output in India and the US would be roughly equal.6  
                                                 
3  See O’Neill et al. (2004). 
4   For a discussion of the methodology, assumptions and conclusions, see Wilson and Purushothaman 
(2004). 
5   The authors recognize this limitation to state: ‘there is a good chance that our projections are not met, 
either through bad policy or bad luck’ (Wilson and Purushothaman 2004: 25). 
6    For a detailed discussion, see Rowthorn (2006), who explains the methodology underlying these 
projections in Appendix 1: 17-8. 8 
It needs to be said that these projections suggest broad orders of magnitude rather than 
precise predictions. Even so, such projections highlight the power of compound growth 
rates. For growth rates do indeed matter. If GDP grows at 10 per cent per annum, 
national income doubles in seven years. If GDP per capita grows at 7 per cent per 
annum, per capita income doubles in ten years. If GDP grows at 7 per cent per annum, 
national income doubles in ten years. If GDP per capita grows at 5 per cent per   
annum, per capita income doubles in fourteen years. Growth rates in China and India 
have been in this range for some time. And growth rates in India have accelerated in the 
early 2000s. Growth rates in Brazil were also in this range during the period 1951-80 
and could return to that path once again. If such growth rates are sustained, their 
cumulative impact over time is no surprise. However, growth is not simply about 
arithmetic. In fact, it is about more than economics. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the economic determinants of growth. 
In principle, China and India may be able to sustain high rates of economic growth for 
some time to come for the following reasons. Brazil may also be able to attain high rates 
of growth for similar reasons although their relative importance may be different. First, 
their population size is large and income levels are low. Second, their demographic 
characteristics, in particular the high proportion of young people in the population, 
which would mean an increase in the work force for some time to come, are conducive 
to growth. Third, in China and India more than in Brazil, wages are significantly lower 
than in the world outside while there are large reservoirs of surplus labour. Fourth, 
emerging technological capabilities have the potential to support productivity increase. 
In practice, however, China, India and Brazil may not be able to sustain their high rates 
of growth because of constraints that are already discernible. In China, the declining 
productivity of investment at the margin and the sustainability of the political system 
are both potential constraints. In India, the crisis in agriculture, the bottlenecks in 
infrastructure and the limited spread of education in society are potential constraints. In 
Brazil, the level and the productivity of investment, both of which are low, constrain 
growth at a macrolevel. Of course, these constraints are illustrative rather than 
exhaustive. And there are many other problems in these countries, which could slow 
down the process of growth. Even if growth slows down, however, a catch-up scenario 
is plausible but it would require a longer period of time. 
2  Engines of economic growth in the world 
Globalization is associated with increasing economic openness, growing economic 
interdependence and deepening economic integration in the world economy. In such a 
world, growth prospects would be significantly influenced, if not shaped, by the growth 
performance of lead economies. The discussion that follows asks whether China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa could be new engines of growth, to consider the underlying 
causation and mechanisms. 
2.1  Engines of growth 
History provides obvious examples. Britain in the nineteenth century and United States 
in the twentieth century were engines of growth for the world economy. Statistical 9 
analysis for the period since the early 1960s provides confirmation.7 It is widely 
accepted that GDP growth in the United States leads GDP growth in the world. A 
statistical analysis of long-term trends in economic growth, with five-year moving 
averages for both sets of growth rates, yields a correlation coefficient of 0.82, while a 
simple lead-lag analysis shows that the US economy leads the world economy by one 
year. Evidence available also reveals that developing countries, excluding China, follow 
the trends in world economic growth and, hence, trends in economic growth of the 
United States. It is worth noting that economic growth in developing countries follows 
economic growth in the United States with a lag but with more pronounced swings in 
cyclical ups and downs.  
In reflecting on the future, is it possible to think of China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
as engines of growth for the developing world, even if not for the world economy? The 
answer depends, in large part, on the size of the four economies and their rates of 
growth. There are some pointers in recent experience. Statistical analysis shows that, 
since 1980, the Chinese economy also leads world GDP, with a lag of one or two years, 
although the correlation coefficient is much smaller than that for the United States.8 
This is not surprising. For one, in 2005, China accounted for 5 per cent of world GDP at 
market exchange rates and 14 per cent of world GDP in PPP terms. For another, GDP 
growth in China has been in the range of 9 per cent per annum for 25 years. By these 
criteria, India is not an engine of growth, at least yet. This is also not surprising. Its 
economic size is smaller than that of China and its growth rate is not as high. For one, in 
2005, India accounted for only 2 per cent of world GDP at market exchange rates and 
6 per cent of world GDP in PPP terms. For another, GDP growth in India has been in 
the range of 6 per cent per annum for 25 years. Even so, India is a potential engine of 
growth in terms of both attributes. Brazil presents a mixed picture. Its economic size is 
significant. In 2005, Brazil accounted for 2.5 per cent of world GDP both at market 
exchange rates and in PPP terms. But GDP growth has been just 2 per cent per annum 
for the past 25 years. Brazil has the economic size but not the growth rate to drive the 
world economy. South Africa provides a sharp contrast. In 2005, it accounted for only 
0.6 per cent of world GDP at market exchange rates and 0.8 per cent of world GDP in 
PPP terms. And GDP growth has been only 2 per cent per annum for the past 25 years. 
Clearly, South Africa meets neither criteria, whether size or growth. Of course, given 
their economic size in relation to most developing countries, the four countries together 
could be a possible engine of growth for the developing world, but that would depend 
on the degree and the nature of linkages. 
Rapid economic growth in lead economies drives economic growth elsewhere in the 
world by providing markets for exports, resources for investment, finances for 
development, and technologies for productivity. The classic examples—Britain in the 
nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—provide confirmation 
of the suggested economic causation and the possible transmission mechanisms. Indeed, 
during their periods of dominance in the world, both Britain and the United States were 
engines of growth, in so far as they provided the rest of the world not only with markets 
for exports and resources for investment, but also with finances for development and 
                                                 
7   For a more detailed discussion on the statistical evidence and analysis cited in this paragraph, see 
United Nations (2006). 
8   See United Nations (2006: 22-3). 10 
technologies for productivity. And, despite the diminished dominance, the Unites States 
economy continues to be an engine of growth for the world. At this juncture, China is not 
quite an engine of growth in every dimension. Economic growth in China provides a 
stimulus to economic growth elsewhere, in large part, as a market for exports. So far, 
India and Brazil cannot be characterized as engines of growth in any dimension, perhaps 
not even as markets for exports. But, along with China, India and Brazil have some future 
potential in terms of markets for exports, resources for investment and technologies for 
productivity. South Africa is the obvious outlier in this picture, although it could provide 
some impetus to the growth process in Africa if linkages turn out right.  
2.2  Causation and mechanisms 
The economic causation outlined above is necessary but not sufficient. The overall 
effects of economic growth in lead economies on economic growth elsewhere depend 
upon: (i) whether such growth is complementary or competitive, (ii) whether the direct 
effects are reinforced or counter-acted by the indirect effects, and (iii) whether, on 
balance, the impact is positive or negative.9 
In principle, economic growth in lead economies may be complementary or competitive 
to economic growth elsewhere. It may be complementary in so far as it increases the 
demand for exports but it may be competitive in so far as it develops alternative sources 
of supply. It may be complementary if it provides resources for investment or finances 
for development but it may be competitive if it pre-empts such resources for investment 
or finances for development. It may be complementary if it provides technologies to 
others but it may be competitive if it stifles the development of technologies elsewhere. 
This distinction between the complementary and the competitive aspects is widely 
recognized. However, the distinction between direct effects and indirect effects is less 
clear because the latter sometimes are difficult to discern, let alone measure. In 
situations where direct effects are complementary, indirect effects could be reinforcing 
if complementary, but counter-acting if competitive. Some examples might be 
illustrative. The direct effects may be complementary if the lead economies, say China, 
India, Brazil or South Africa, provide cheap wage goods to other developing countries, 
but the indirect effects may be competitive if competition from firms in lead economies 
squeezes out local firms in other developing countries. The direct effects may be 
complementary if firms from these lead economies invest in other developing countries, 
but the indirect effects may be competitive if firms from industrialized countries 
relocate production and invest in China, India, Brazil or South Africa rather than in 
other developing countries. The direct effects may be complementary if these lead 
economies provide cheaper inputs for manufactured exports from other developing 
countries but the indirect effects may be competitive if competition from the lead 
economies squeezes out manufactured exports from other developing countries in the 
markets of industrialized countries. In principle, then, the impact of economic growth in 
lead economies on economic growth elsewhere, in different spheres, could be positive, 
or negative, or some combination of both. Therefore, on balance, such impact can be 
                                                 
9   For a detailed discussion, see Kaplinsky (2006). The literature on this subject is limited. But the 
implications and consequences of rapid growth in China and India, for the developing world, are 
analysed in Kaplinsky and Messner (2008).  11 
either positive or negative. The outcomes may differ across space and change over time 
so that generalizations are difficult.10 
The main mechanisms of interaction, through which outcomes would be shaped, are 
international trade, investment and finance. These are considered later in the paper. In 
this context, however, it is worth noting that domestic developments within such large 
countries could also have international consequences. For instance, macroeconomic 
policies in China, India, and Brazil, once they become lead economies, may exercise an 
important influence on economic growth elsewhere. If such policies are countercyclical, 
which has been the case for the United States, these would be supportive of economic 
growth elsewhere. But if these policies are procyclical, which is common in developing 
countries, these could be disruptive for economic growth elsewhere. Similarly, 
exchange rates and interest rates in lead economies could exercise a significant 
influence, either positive or negative, on economic growth elsewhere in the world. For 
example, an undervalued exchange rate in China, which has persisted for quite some 
time, constrains the prospects for labour-intensive manufactured exports from other 
developing countries, thereby limiting the potential demand stimulus to economic 
growth that could be provided by exports. Similarly, the combination of a high interest 
rate and a strong exchange rate, which has been the case for some time in both India and 
Brazil albeit for different reasons, pre-empts possible foreign capital inflows thereby 
limiting the potential external finance necessary to support economic growth in other 
developing countries. 
3  Possible impact of rapid growth in China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
Rapid economic growth in China and India, if it is sustained at the projected rates, is 
bound to exercise considerable influence on prospects for the world economy, the 
industrialized countries and the developing countries. This impact could be either 
positive or negative.  
3.1 World  economy 
The consequences for the world economy could be positive if, as the old engine   
of growth slows down, China, India, Brazil and South Africa emerge as new engines of 
growth that drive the process. Ultimately, it is possible that the new engines replace the 
old engines of growth. This is, at best, a scenario for the future. The preceding 
discussion suggests that rapid growth in China supports but does not yet lead growth in 
the world economy. India and Brazil have the potential to provide similar support but 
this has not materialized so far. South Africa does not even exhibit such a potential. It is 
clear that for some time to come the United States economy would continue to be the 
engine of growth for the world economy. But this dominance is bound to diminish as 
rapid growth in large emerging economies of the developing world slowly yet surely 
changes the balance of economic power in the world. 
                                                 
10  There is a clear need for more systematic research on the subject, where information and 
understanding are both limited. 12 
The impact of rapid economic growth in China, India, Brazil and South Africa on the 
world economy could also be negative in the form of environmental consequences and 
labour market consequences. Much of the literature tends to focus on the environmental 
consequences of rapid economic growth in China and India. The energy needs of these 
two mega economies are enormous. This is not surprising as levels of consumption per 
capita are low and income elasticities of demand are high. In absolute terms, China’s 
demand for oil is catching up rapidly with that of Europe and the United States while 
China’s CO2 emissions are now only exceeded by the United States. India lags behind 
China but the process of catch-up has commenced. Energy consumption in Brazil and 
South Africa is also likely to grow, even if not as rapidly as in China and India. It would 
mean too much of a digression to enter into a discussion of this complex issue here.11 
In the context of the world economy, the other issue that has received some attention is 
the consequences for the labour market. The focus, once again, is on China and India. It 
has been argued by Richard Freeman that the entry of China, India and the erstwhile 
socialist countries of Europe into the world economy has had a dramatic impact on the 
size of the global workforce. He argues that, if nothing had changed, the world labour 
force would have increased from almost one billion people in 1980 to about 1.5 billion 
people in 2000, attributable, in large part, to population growth. In fact, however, he 
concludes that the world labour force in 2000 was double the size, at three billion, 
attributable largely to the economic integration of China, India and the transition 
economies with the world.12 Freeman believes that this transformation is good for 
workers in low-income countries and bad for workers in high-income countries. The 
conclusion drawn is not protectionist. It is much more nuanced. Freeman suggests 
government intervention, in the national and international context, that would be 
conducive to a more harmonious integration of China and India, to which we could add 
Brazil and South Africa, into the world economy. In pursuit of this objective, he 
suggests that it would be important to follow the good examples of integration, such as 
the integration of Western Europe and Japan into the world economy after the Second 
World War, rather than the bad examples of integration, such as the integration of the 
southern part of the US into the US after the Civil War or the integration of East 
Germany into Germany after unification. This proposition is clearly sensible. Even so, it 
is important to recognize two essential limitations of the Freeman hypothesis.13 For one, 
it seeks to focus far too much on the supply side in terms of labour market consequences 
in the world economy, while it neglects the demand side in so far as rapid economic 
growth in China and India, as well as Brazil, could also provide an impetus to growth in 
the world economy. For another, it underestimates the strength and dynamism of the US 
economy, embedded in history which provides it with a competitive edge even in the 
early twenty-first century. 
                                                 
11 For some evidence and discussion on this issue, see Rowthorn (2006) and Kaplinsky (2006). 
12 For a more detailed discussion on this proposition, see Freeman (2005). 
13 For a critical, yet nuanced, evaluation of the Freeman hypothesis, see Singh (2007). 13 
3.2 Industrialized  countries 
The impact of rapid economic growth in China, India, Brazil and South Africa on the 
industrialized countries could be either positive or negative. The focus is often on the 
negative. But there is also the positive. Consider each in turn. 
There are three reasons why the impact may be negative. First, rapid economic growth 
in China, India, Brazil and South Africa may worsen the terms of trade for 
industrialized countries. The burgeoning demand from CIBS could drive up the prices 
of primary commodities in the world market. At the same time, rising wages in CIBS 
could drive up prices of labour-intensive manufactured goods in the world market. Both 
could turn the terms of trade against industrialized countries. Rowthorn (2006), who 
examines this issue in some depth, argues that terms of trade for industrialized countries 
might worsen over time but the consequences would be easy to absorb because the 
process would be spread over a long period of time.14 What is more, its impact in terms 
of loss of real income in the industrialized world would be modest.  
Second, for the industrialized countries, China, India, Brazil and South Africa could 
emerge as new destinations that may become a source of competition for investment. 
This may happen if firms from the industrialized countries, whether United States or 
Europe, relocate production in China, India, Brazil or South Africa. Even if they do not, 
it would strengthen capital and weaken labour in terms of bargaining power, thereby 
exercising some outward pressure on wages. Rowthorn, who also examines this issue in 
depth, concludes that it is a limited phenomenon so far and is not likely to happen on a 
larger scale for quite some time to come.15  
Third, the economic rise of China, India, Brazil and South Africa may lead to a 
downward pressure on employment levels and real wages in the industrialized countries. 
It needs to be said that this concern is somewhat exaggerated. It is important to 
recognize that the stagnation in real wages and the high levels of unemployment in the 
industrialized countries are attributable to the nature of technical progress, which is 
replacing several unskilled workers with a few skilled workers, and the impact of 
macroeconomic policies which have sought to maintain price stability at the expense of 
full employment. The source of these problems lies within the industrialized countries 
and not in their trade with developing countries.16 And even if the expansion of such 
trade in manufactured goods with China, India, Brazil and South Africa could exert 
some downward pressure on employment levels or real wages in industrialized 
countries, such pressures are bound to diminish with the ageing of industrial societies.17 
                                                 
14 It is argued that such a loss could be quite severe if all of it came at the same time but if it were spread 
over many years it would have only a marginal impact. For instance, if the United States experienced 
a deterioration in its terms of trade which lowered real income by the equivalent of 5 per cent of GDP 
over a period of 25 years, per capita income would grow by 1.6 per cent per annum instead of its 
present trend rate of 1.8 per cent per annum (Rowthorn 2006: 9). 
15 For a discussion, see Rowthorn (2006). It must also be recognized that the high mobility of capital 
combined with the low mobility of labour in the contemporary world economy has already 
strengthened capital and weakened labour, so that any observed downward pressure on wages cannot 
be attributed to trade with CIBS alone. 
16 This argument is developed, at length, in Nayyar (1996). 
17 For a discussion, and some evidence, see Nayyar (2002). 14 
There are other two reasons, stressed by Rowthorn (2006) and Singh (2007), which 
confirm that such concerns about employment and wages are probably exaggerated. For 
one, there is the Krugman proposition that ‘economic history offers no examples of a 
country that experienced long-term productivity growth without a roughly equal rise in 
real wages’.18 Thus, in the long run, productivity increase in China and India would 
also be followed, after a time, by a commensurate increase in real wages. For another, a 
coordination of macroeconomic polities, reinforced by the logic of international 
collective action, could be an important means of minimizing the social costs for 
workers in the industrialized countries, during the transition period in which China, 
India, Brazil and South Africa integrate into the world economy. 
It is just as important to recognize that rapid economic growth in China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa may have a positive impact on the industrialized countries.19 First, 
starting from low levels of income per capita juxtaposed with high income elasticities of 
demand, higher incomes associated with rapid growth would create expanding markets 
for exports from industrialized countries. Second, these emerging economies could be a 
source of cheap manufactured goods that could help reduce inflationary pressures in 
industrialized countries, thereby enabling them to maintain higher levels of output and 
employment than would otherwise be possible. Third, these emerging economies could 
be a source of new technologies in the future that could help extend production 
possibility frontiers and consumer possibility frontiers in the industrialized economies.   
3.3 Developing  countries 
During the first quarter of the twenty-first century, economic growth in China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa could have a positive impact on developing countries if it 
improves terms of trade, provides appropriate technologies, and creates new sources of 
finance for development, whether investment or aid. Consider each in turn. 
It is clear that, for some time to come, the positive impact on developing countries 
would be transmitted through an improvement in their terms of trade.20 Rapid economic 
growth in China and India is bound to boost the demand for primary commodities 
exported by developing countries. The reasons are simple enough. Both China and India 
have large populations. But that is not all. In both countries, levels of consumption per 
capita in most primary commodities are low, while income elasticities of demand for 
most primary commodities are high. This burgeoning demand will almost certainly raise 
prices of primary commodities in world markets and thereby improve the terms of trade 
for developing countries. It would benefit Brazil and South Africa as exporters of 
primary commodities, while the revival of growth in Brazil and South Africa, when it 
happens, would reinforce this process. What is more, China already is, while India and 
Brazil are likely to become, sources of manufactured goods in the world market. Such 
manufactures, particularly wage goods but also capital goods, from China, India and 
Brazil are likely to be cheaper than competing goods from industrialized countries. At 
                                                 
18 Krugman (1994). This argument is developed further, in the China-India context, by Rowthorn (2006) 
and Singh (2007). 
19 The underlying factors mentioned in this paragraph are also emphasized by Singh (2007) and 
Rowthorn (2006), with reference to China and India.  
20 This proposition is stressed by Kaplinsky (2006), Rowthorn (2006) and Singh (2007). 15 
the same time, Brazil and South Africa could provide cheaper natural resource-based 
manufactures. This would also improve the terms of trade for developing countries. 
The positive impact of China, India, Brazil and South Africa on developing countries 
through the other potential channels of transmission is not as clear. We do not yet have 
either the evidence or the experience. In principle, it is possible that China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa would develop technologies that are more appropriate for the factor 
endowments and the economic needs of developing countries. But it is too early to 
come to a judgment on this matter. Similarly, China, India, Brazil and South Africa are 
potential sources of finance for development. Their foreign aid programmes, 
particularly in Africa, constitute a modest beginning.21 But their contribution in terms 
of foreign direct investment is limited so far.  
The emergence of China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the world economy could 
also have a negative impact on developing countries if these economies provide 
developing countries with competition in markets for exports or as destinations for 
investment. Consider each in turn. 
At this juncture, China is clearly the largest supplier of labour-intensive manufactured 
goods in the world market. Even if not as large as China, India is also a significant 
supplier of labour-intensive manufactured goods in the world market. Brazil and South 
Africa are important suppliers of natural resource-based manufactures. China, India and 
Brazil are emerging suppliers of capital goods. There can be little doubt that 
manufactured exports from China, India, Brazil and South Africa span almost the entire 
range of manufactured exports in which other developing countries could have a 
potential comparative advantage. Hence, it is plausible to argue though impossible to 
prove, that on balance China, India, Brazil and South Africa possibly have a negative 
impact on manufactured exports from other developing countries which have to 
compete with these four economies for export markets in industrialized countries.22 
This can change if and when China and India vacate their space in the international 
trade matrix, in much the same way as latecomers to industrialization in Asia such as 
Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, vacated their space in the market for 
simple labour-intensive manufactures for countries that followed in their footsteps. It is 
not likely, at least in the medium term, because both China and India have large 
reservoirs of surplus labour at low wages not only in the rural hinterlands but also in the 
urban informal sectors. Brazil and South Africa may not have such large reservoirs of 
surplus labour, but given their abundance in primary commodities and natural resources, 
it is not likely that they would vacate their space in the market for processed products or 
resource-based manufactures for other developing countries that have similar 
endowments from nature.  
The evidence presented later in the paper shows that China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa absorb a significant proportion of inward foreign direct investment in developing 
countries both in terms of stocks and flows. Given that China, India and Brazil are now 
among the most attractive destinations for transnational firms seeking to locate 
                                                 
21  For a discussion on China’s trade with, and aid to Africa, see Toye (2008). 
22  Kaplinsky and Morris (2008) show that China’s emergence as a large exporter of manufactured goods 
in the world economy poses severe problems for export-oriented growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly in textiles and clothing. 16 
production in the developing world, it is once again plausible to suggest though 
impossible to prove that foreign direct investment in China, India and Brazil might be at 
the expense of developing countries. South Africa may not have the same attraction as a 
destination, but it may draw foreign direct investment that could have gone to 
developing countries in Africa. At the same time, the share of China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa in outward foreign direct investment in the world economy, as also from 
developing countries, is modest in both stocks and flows, so that firms from these four 
countries do not compensate with foreign direct investment in other developing 
countries.  
The less discernible but more significant negative impact of the four economies, 
particularly China, on developing countries are the implicit barriers to change in the 
traditional division of labour and specialization in production. For one, China and India 
might pre-empt opportunities for other developing countries to industrialize through 
exports of labour-intensive manufactures, which is attributable to their surplus labour 
and low wages that might continue for some time to come. For another, Brazil and 
South Africa might pre-empt opportunities for other developing countries to 
industrialize through agro-based or resource-intensive manufactures, which is 
attributable to their abundance in primary commodities and natural resources. But this is 
no more than a plausible hypothesis about possible future developments which cannot 
be tested.  
The problem has, however, surfaced in one dimension. China’s present division of 
labour with the developing world, reflected in the composition of trade flows, is not 
different from the old north-south pattern of trade, in so far as Chinese imports from 
developing world are largely primary commodities while Chinese exports to the 
developing world are largely manufactured goods.23 China’s trade with countries in 
South-East Asia is the exception to this rule. But Chinese trade with, and investment in, 
Africa confirms even more closely to this caricature neocolonial pattern. Such 
traditional patterns of trade, it should be recognized can neither transform the structure 
of production in developing countries nor make for a new international division of 
labour. Indeed, such trade can only perpetuate the dependence of developing countries 
on exports of primary commodities without creating possibilities of increasing   
value-added before export or entering into manufacturing activities characterized by 
economies of scale. Such path-dependent specialization can only curb the possibilities 
of structural transformation in developing countries. Trade with China can sustain 
growth and support industrialization in developing countries only if there is a successful 
transition from a complementary to a competitive pattern of trade, so that inter-sectoral 
trade is gradually replaced by intra-sectoral or intra-industry trade and specialization.  
                                                 
23 An unpublished study by Rhys Jenkins and Chris Edwards, cited in United Nations (2006a: 22), on 
China’s trade with 18 developing countries (six in Asia, six in Africa and six in Latin America) shows 
that countries that had significant trade with China were exporting mostly agricultural or extractive, 
primary commodities. A study on China’s economic interaction with Latin America and the Caribbean 
also confirms the traditional pattern of trade, importing mostly primary commodities and exporting 
mostly manufactured goods (Inter-American Development Bank 2005). Another study on the impact 
of China’s trade with, and foreign direct investment in, Latin America and the Caribbean shows that 
there are winners and losers that can be identified: primary commodity-producing sectors and 
countries are the winners, while sectors and countries producing or exporting manufactured goods are 
the losers (Jenkins, Peters and Moreira 2008). 17 
4  Channels of engagement and transmission 
The preceding discussion is largely in terms of macroeconomic aggregates. It is also 
necessary to consider the forms of engagement with the world economy, through which 
the impact of rapid economic growth in China, India, Brazil and South Africa, whether 
positive or negative, is transmitted elsewhere. The obvious, and most important, 
channels of transmission are international trade, international investment, international 
finance and international migration.  
4.1  International trade  
International trade is, perhaps, the most important form of engagement with the world 
economy not only for China, India, Brazil and South Africa, but also for developing 
countries. Available evidence provides confirmation. Exports and imports of goods and 
services as a proportion of GDP rose from 44 per cent to 69 per cent in China, from 
28 per cent to 45 per cent in India, from 23 per cent to 29 per cent in Brazil, from 53 per 
cent to 56 per cent in South Africa, and from 56 per cent to 67 per cent in developing 
countries.24 Table 4 presents evidence on trade in goods, for China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa, with the developing countries, the industrialized countries and the world 
as a whole in 2000 and 2005. It shows the relative importance of China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa, as markets for exports and sources of imports for the world. The share 
of CIBS in world trade almost doubled in this short span of time from than 5.7 per cent 
in 2000 to about 9.8 per cent in 2005. The share of CIBS in the trade of developing 
countries increased from 19 per cent in 2000 to 27 per cent in 2005. The share of CIBS 
in the trade of industrialized countries increased from 6 per cent in 2000 to 10 per cent 
in 2005.25 The emerging significance is clear. In 2005, China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, taken together, accounted for about one-tenth of merchandise trade in the world, 
more than one-fourth the merchandise trade of developing countries, and one-tenth the 
merchandise trade of industrialized countries. It is worth noting that these aggregate 
proportions may be somewhat deceptive because, in 2005, China accounted for as much 
as 72 per cent, India accounted for 12 per cent, Brazil accounted for 10 per cent and 
South Africa accounted for only 6 per cent of CIBS trade with the world. The respective 
shares of these countries in CIBS trade with developing countries and industrialized 
countries were about the same.26 
 
 
                                                 
24 These figures, obtained from data reported in World Bank (2007), relate to exports and imports of 
goods and services as a proportion of GDP. Even so, it needs to be said that for large countries such as 
China and India, these trade-GDP ratios are high and may not be sustainable in the long term. 
Merchandise trade flows, presented in Table 4 and discussed in this paragraph, are perhaps the more 
appropriate indicator. 
25 The shares of CIBS in the trade of developing countries, industrialized countries and the world, 
reported in this paragraph, are calculated from the data in Table 4 and relate to total trade, that is, the 
sum total of exports and imports. 
26 The share of South Africa was somewhat higher in trade with industrialized countries and somewhat 
lower in trade with developing countries. 18 
Table 4 
Trade flows ($ billion), China, India, Brazil and South Africa, 2000 and 2005 
  Exports, total    Imports, total 
  2000 2005   2000 2005 
China  249 762   225 660 
India  42 100    52 139 
Brazil  55  118   59 78 
South  Africa  30 52   30 62 
Total  above  377  1,031   365 939 
        
World  6,444 10,441    6,642 10,712 
(CIBS as % of)  (5.8)  (9.9)   (5.5) (8.8) 
        
  Exports to developing countries    Imports from developing countries
China  102 317   104 330 
India  17 52    17 45 
Brazil  21 56   24 38 
South  Africa  8 15    9 22 
Total above  148  440    154 434 
        
Developing  countries  803 1614    791 1664 
(CIBS as % of)  (18.4)  (27.3)   (19.4) (26.1) 
        
  Exports to industrialized countries Imports from industrialized countries
China  144 421   106 254 
India  23 44   21 46 
Brazil  31 54   37 41 
South  Africa  14 31   20 38 
Total above  212  550    184 380 
        
Industrialized  countries 3161 4645   3151 4553 
(CIBS as % of)  (6.7)  (11.9)    (5.8)  (8.3) 
Notes:   (a)   CIBS stands for China, India, Brazil and South Africa; 
   (b)  The figures in this table are on merchandise trade, exports and imports, in US$ billion at 
current prices. 
Source:   UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics Online (www//stats.unctad.org/handbook). 
4.2 International  investment 
The picture of international investment is different. In the global context, the relative 
importance of China, India, Brazil and South Africa is mixed. Table 5 sets out evidence 
on foreign direct investment, inward and outward, in China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, compared with developing countries, industrialized countries and the world. The 
figures on stocks are for 2000 and 2005, while the figures on flows are annual averages 
for the period 2001-05. In the early 2000s, CIBS accounted for 20 to 25 per cent of the 
inward stock of foreign direct investment in developing countries and about 6 per cent 
of that in the world. During the period 2001-05, CIBS accounted for about 37 per cent 
of inward flows of foreign direct investment in developing countries and about 11 per 
cent of those in the world. In the early 2000s, CIBS accounted for about 13 per cent of 
the outward stock of foreign direct investment from developing countries and less than 
2 per cent of that in the world. During the period 2001-05, CIBS accounted for 10 per 
cent of the outward flows of foreign direct investment from developing countries and 
about 1 per cent of those from the world. These aggregate proportions could also be 
deceptive but the distribution of the stock of foreign direct investment, whether inward 
or outward, among CIBS was not as unequal as it was in trade and China was not as 
dominant. In 2005, China accounted for 50 per cent of the inward stock but only 27 per 19 
cent of the outward stock, India accounted for just 7 per cent of the inward stock and 
6 per cent of the outward stock, Brazil accounted 32 per cent of the inward stock and 
43 per cent of the outward stock, while South Africa accounted for 11 per cent of the 
inward stock and 24 per cent of the outward stock.27 It is possible to draw three 
inferences from this evidence. First, foreign direct investment in, and from, China, 
India, Brazil and South Africa is small as a proportion of both stocks and flows in the 
world. Second, for CIBS, inward foreign direct investment is much more significant 
than outward foreign direct investment in terms of both stocks and flows. Third, it 
would seem that China, India, Brazil and South Africa are more competition for, rather 
than a source of, foreign direct investment for developing countries.28 
Table 5 
Foreign direct investment: stocks and flows ($ billion), 2000 and 2005 
  Stocks    Flows (avg per annum)
 Inward  Outward   Inward Outward 
  2000 2005 2000 2005    2001-05  2001-05 
China  193  318 28 46   57  4 
India  18 45  2 10    6  2 
Brazil  103  201 52 72   16  3 
South  Africa  43 69 32 39    3  0 
Total  above  357 634 114 166    82  8 
          
Developing  countries  1697 2655  856 1268    225  80 
(CIBS as % of)  (21.1)  (23.9)  (13.3) (13.1)   (36.6) (10.3) 
          
Developed countries  4,035 7,219 5,593 9,278    476  602 
          
World  5,803 10,130  6,471 10,672    727  691 
(CIBS as % of)  (6.2)  (6.3)  (1.8) (1.6)    (11.3) (1.2) 
Source: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Online Database (www://stats.unctad.org/fdi). 
4.3 International  finance 
International finance is, perhaps, the most limited form of engagement for China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa with the world economy, at least so far, but this could change. 
In principle, these four countries could be potential sources of finances for development 
through current account surpluses, foreign exchange reserves and foreign aid flows. 
Consider each in turn.  
                                                 
27 The distribution of flows among the CIBS was different. During the period 2001-05, China accounted 
for 70 per cent of the inflows and 45 per cent of the outflows, Brazil accounted for 20 per cent of the 
inflows and 33 per cent of the outflows, while India accounted for 7 per cent of the inflows and 22 per 
cent of the outflows. The residual share of South Africa was only 3 per cent in inflows and negligible 
in outflows. It would seem that the relative importance of China in inflows and outflows of foreign 
direct investment from CIBS, registered an increase during the early 2000s. 
28  In this context, it is worth noting that the sectoral composition and geographical distribution of 
outward foreign direct investment from India provides two sharp contrasts with that from developing 
countries. For one, three-fifth of international investment from India is in manufacturing activities 
while this proportion is about one-eighth for developing countries. For another, almost three-fourths 
of international investment from India is in industrialized countries, while this proportion is less than 
one-fifth for developing countries. The proportions for China are similar to those for developing 
countries as a group. In fact, foreign direct investment from China is probably even more concentrated 
in primary commodities and developing countries. For a discussion, see Nayyar (2008). 20 
The current account surplus in the balance of payments is significant for China but that 
is not so for India, Brazil and South Africa. In China, the current account surplus, as a 
proportion of GDP, increased from 2.3 per cent during 1996-2000 to 3.5 per cent during 
2001-05.29 In India, there was a modest current account surplus during 2001-05, the 
equivalent of 0.9 per cent of GDP, while there was a current account deficit during 
1996-2000, the equivalent of 1.1 per cent of GDP. In Brazil, the current account deficit 
decreased from 4 per cent of GDP during 1996-2000 to 0.4 per cent of GDP during 
2001-05. In South Africa, the current account deficit, as a proportion of GDP, increased 
from 1 per cent during 1996-2000 to 1.4 per cent during 2001-05. These figures are 
quinquennial averages that might conceal fluctuations over time. Figure 3 outlines the 
trends in the current account balances, as a percentage of GDP, for these countries 
during the period 1996-2005. It shows that, during 2001-05, the current account balance 
improved rapidly in China and Brazil while it worsened slowly in India and South 
Africa. These trends are easily explained in a wider macroeconomic context. 
Throughout the period 2001-05, as a proportion of GDP, gross domestic savings 






                                                 
29 The data on the current account balance, as a percentage of GDP, for China, India, Brazil and South 























































Current account balance in China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
Source:  World Bank (2007). 21 
of the five years, which is puzzling, whereas gross capital formation exceeded gross 
domestic savings in India.30 This evidence suggests that China is a potential source of 
international finance for developing countries but India, Brazil and South Africa are not, 
at least yet. 
Figure 4 
Gross domestic saving (GDS) and gross capital formation (GCF) 

























































































































































































Source: World Bank (2007). 
 
                                                 
30   During the period 2001-05, in China gross domestic saving was 43.4 per cent of GDP and gross 
capital formation was 40.4 per cent of GDP; in India gross domestic saving was 26.7 per cent of GDP 
and gross capital formation was 28.4 per cent of GDP; in Brazil gross domestic saving was 23.3 per 
cent of GDP and gross capital formation was 20.5 per cent of GDP, whereas in South Africa gross 
domestic saving was 19 per cent of GDP and gross capital formation was 16.8 per cent of GDP. These 







































































































1996  75  14  41  1  131  601  21.8 1,178 11.1 
1997  106  19  38  4  166  691  24.1 1,297 12.8 
1998  106  20  30  3  160  706  22.7 1,282 12.5 
1999  115  24  25  5  170  786  21.6 1,405 12.1 
2000  130  29  25  5  189  902  20.9 1,586 11.9 
2001  172  37  28  5  242 1,022  23.7 1,741 13.9 
2002  215  50  28  5  297 1,127  26.4 1,890 15.7 
2003  275  67  33  5  380 1,306  29.1 2,155 17.6 
2004  396  82  34  9  521 1,588  32.8 2,521 20.7 
2005  575  93  37  13  719 2,035  35.3 3,000 24.0 
Note:   The data relate to international reserves held by the central banks of countries or country-groups 
at the end of the calendar year. 
Source:   IMF International Financial Statistics Online Database (www://imfStatistics.org). 
 
In the sphere of foreign exchange reserves, however, the similarities are greater than the 
differences. Table 6 outlines the trends in foreign exchange reserves from 1996 to 2005 
for China, India, Brazil, South Africa, developing countries and the world. It shows that 
both China and India accumulated international reserves at a rapid rate. In Brazil, 
international reserves went down and then recovered. In South Africa, international 
reserves increased slowly but remained at modest levels. Between 1996 and 2005, the 
share of CIBS in the total foreign exchange reserves of developing countries rose from 
22 per cent to 35 per cent, while their share of foreign exchange reserves in the world as 
a whole more than doubled from 11.1 per cent to 24 per cent. Once again, it is important 
to note that these aggregates are deceptive because, in 2005, China accounted for 80 per 
cent of the international reserves held by the four countries taken together, whereas 
India accounted for 13 per cent, Brazil accounted for just 5 per cent and South Africa 
accounted for a mere 2 per cent. The substantial importance of China, India and Brazil 
in foreign exchange reserves held by central banks, however, does not quite translate 
into a potential source of finance for developing countries. This is so for two reasons. 
First, an overwhelming proportion of these foreign exchange reserves are held in the 
form of fiduciary deposits or government bonds in industrialized countries, so that 
actual placements are not put to any strategic use, let alone provide a potential source of 
finance for development. Second, even these massive foreign exchange reserves are 
marginal in relation to transactions in international finance, given that daily transactions 
in foreign exchange in world markets are perhaps as large as the foreign exchange 
reserves held by all the central banks in the world.31  
The possibilities are much greater in the sphere of foreign aid and development 
assistance. China, India, Brazil and South Africa are emerging as donors, with a 
                                                 
31  In April 1997, for example, the average turnover in foreign exchange markets in the world was the 
equivalent of US$1490 billion per day while, at the end of 1997, the foreign exchange reserves of all 
the central banks in the world put together were US$1550 billion (Nayyar 2006).  23 
significant presence in Africa. The thrust of China’s aid programmes is development 
finance, whereas the focus of India’s aid programmes is technical assistance. Evidence 
on foreign aid flows from China, India, Brazil and South Africa to developing countries 
is not readily available. It is clear, however, that foreign aid from these four countries is 
relatively small as compared with foreign aid provided by the industrialized countries.32 
Yet, it is possible that the multiplier effects of aid from China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, as also from other emerging donors such as Korea, may be significant for two 
reasons. For one, technical assistance may alleviate infrastructural constraints in 
developing countries. For another, emerging donors could be a catalyst for aid flows 
from the industrialized countries in much the same way as foreign aid from the socialist 
countries was a catalyst in the cold war era. 
4.4 International  migration 
International migration is, possibly, a significant form of engagement with the world 
economy, particularly for India and, to some extent, China, but much less so for Brazil 
and almost negligible for South Africa. In the contemporary world economy, it is 
possible to distinguish between four categories of cross-border movements of people. 
The traditional category is emigrants who move to a country and settle there 
permanently. The new categories are guest workers, illegal migrants and professionals. 
Guest workers are people who move to a country on a temporary basis for a specified 
purpose and a limited duration. Illegal migrants are people who enter a country without 
a visa, take up employment on a tourist visa or simply stay after their visa has expired. 
Professionals are people with high levels of education, experience and qualification, 
whose skills are in demand everywhere and can move from country to country, 
temporarily or permanently. Both China and India have always been, and continue to 
be, important countries-of-origin for international migration. Globalization has, 
however, increased the mobility of labour in the new categories.33 India, China, and 
possibly Brazil, are also countries-of-origin for such cross-border movements of people. 
Remittances are, perhaps, the most important source of development finance associated 
with international migration.34 Indeed, for India, remittances are a substantial source of 
external finance.35 This is not so for China, Brazil and South Africa. During the period 
1996-2005, remittance inflows were the equivalent of 2.7 per cent of GDP in India, but 
only 0.15 per cent of GDP in China, 0.26 per cent of GDP in Brazil and 0.08 per cent of 
GDP in South Africa.36 In this context, it is important to note that India, China and 
                                                 
32  During the period 2001-05, net official development assistance (ODA) disbursements from   
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries were US$73200 million per annum, while net 
ODA disbursements from non-DAC donors were a mere US$575million per annum. For the annual 
statistics, see www//stats.oecd.org/wbos. It is worth noting that non-DAC donors include Saudi 
Arabia, Korea, Turkey, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, among 
others, but net ODA disbursements from China, India, Brazil and South Africa are not even reported 
in these OECD statistics on foreign aid.  
33 The changing nature of international migration is analysed, at some length, in Nayyar (2002).  
34 See Solimano (2005) and Nayyar (2008c). 
35 For an analysis of the macroeconomic significance of remittances in India, see Nayyar (1994). 
36  These percentages have been calculated from data on remittances obtained from the IMF balance of 
payments statistics online data base and from data on GDP in World Bank (2007). 24 
Brazil export labour to, rather than import labour from, the outside world. 
Consequently, remittances from India, China and Brazil cannot simply enter the picture 
as a source of development finance. The engagement of India and China with the world, 
through international migration, is attributable in the past to the diaspora. In the present, 
the engagement of India, China and Brazil with the world economy, through cross-
border movements of people, is attributable to globalization.  
The diaspora has historical origins. Following the abolition of slavery in the British 
Empire, starting around the mid-1830s, for a period of fifty years, about 50 million 
people left India and China to work as indentured labour in mines, plantations and 
construction in the Americas, the Caribbean, South Africa, South East Asia and other 
distant lands.37 This was probably close to 10 per cent of the total population of India 
and China circa 1880. The migration from India and China continued, in somewhat 
different forms, during the first half of the twentieth century, particularly in the period 
between the two world wars. There is, consequently, a significant presence of the 
diaspora from China and India across the world not only in the industrialized countries 
but also in the developing countries. This is associated with entrepreneurial capitalisms, 
Chinese and Indian, in developing countries as well as the industrialized world, where 
the migration stream has aged.  
The second half of the twentieth century also witnessed significant waves of 
international migration from India, made up of permanent emigration to the 
industrialized countries and temporary migration to the oil-exporting countries in the 
Middle East.38 The international migration from China, however, was limited during 
this period. Of course, such migration, particularly to the industrialized countries, is 
now constrained by immigration laws and consular practices. But the gathering 
momentum of globalization during the past two decades has led to a significant increase 
in the new categories of cross-border movements of people. In this sphere, the 
engagement of India with the world economy is much more than that of China, Brazil or 
South Africa. The advent of globalization, which has also made it easier to move people 
across borders, is associated with managerial capitalisms, especially with professionals 
from India, and to some extent Brazil, who can migrate permanently, live abroad 
temporarily, or stay at home and travel frequently for business. These people are almost 
as mobile as capital across borders.  
                                                 
37  See Tinker (1974) and Lewis (1977). See also Nayyar (2002).  
38  For a discussion of, and evidence on, international migration from India, see Nayyar (1994).  25 
5  The global context 
It is necessary to recognize that the significance of China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
in the world would be shaped not only in the sphere of economics but also in the realm 
of politics. Their emerging significance in the world economy is attributable in part to 
their share in world population and in world income and in part to their engagement 
with the world through international trade, investment and finance. The early 2000s are 
perhaps a turning point. Even so, in the economic sphere, their potential importance in 
future far exceeds their actual importance at present. In the realm of politics, however, 
their importance is more discernible at the present juncture which is attributable in part 
to their size and in part to their rise. It is plausible to argue, though impossible to prove, 
that this represents the beginnings of a profound change in the balance of economic and 
political power in the world. History does not repeat itself. But it would be wise to learn 
from history. The early twentieth century was a turning point. It was the beginning of 
the end of Britain’s dominance in the world. And it was the beginning of the rise of the 
United States to dominance in the world. The catch-up and the transformation spanned 
half a century. The early twenty-first century perhaps represents a similar turning point. 
It could be the beginning of the end of the dominant status of the United States in the 
world. The emergence of countries outside North America and Western Europe, 
particularly the powerhouse economies in Asia, which began with the East Asian 
success stories and is now manifest in the rise of China and India, represents a striking 
transformation. In addition, there are emerging economies in other continents of the 
developing world, among which Brazil and South Africa deserve mention. Of course, in 
the decades to come, the continued rise of these countries is not quite predictable and by 
no means certain. This catch-up and transformation could also span half a century or 
longer. Yet, the beginnings of a shift in the balance of power are discernible. 
This is going to shape the international politics of nation states in times to come, not 
only through bilateralism but also through pluralilateriam. China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa are each engaged in a bilateralism that is both intra-regional and 
interregional. There are intra-regional initiatives led by China and India in Asia, by 
Brazil in Latin America and by South Africa in Africa. There are also some 
interregional initiatives on the part of these countries, such as China taking a lead in 
forging APEC and India seeking a partnership with ASEAN. China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa are also beginning to engage in a plurilateralism. There are two striking 
examples. At one level, India, Brazil and South Africa have constituted a plurilateral 
group, the G-3 or IBSA, attempting to develop a strategic alliance that would foster 
partnership among them, promote cooperation with developing countries and articulate 
a collective voice in international politics. At another level, China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa, together with Mexico, constitute the Outreach-5, who had been invited to 
the G-8 Summit in recent years. There is a hint of discontent about their status as 
observers peripheral to deliberations and decisions. And the Outreach-5 are now seeking 
a place at the high table with the G-8. 
From the perspective of the developing world, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, 
together, may be able to exercise significant influence through multilateralism, whether 
institutions or rules, in the global context. The United Nations, the World Bank, the 26 
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization are among the most 
important multilateral institutions.39  
In the United Nations, China alone is a permanent member of the Security Council with 
a right to veto. And it is also a member of the P-5. But India, Brazil and South Africa 
are engaged in knocking at the door, seeking permanent membership of the Security 
Council, with or without a veto. There can be little doubt that if and when there is an 
increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council in the United 
Nations, these three countries would have the strongest claim to permanent 
membership.  
In the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa are permanent members of the Executive Boards. 
The industrialized countries may be the principal shareholders but the developing 
countries are the principal stakeholders. Given the democratic deficit in these 
institutions, which is embedded in unequal voting rights, China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa together could influence decisions or even reshape rules. So far, however, there 
is a limited, if any, coordination among CIBS for this purpose.40 They have neither 
articulated collective voice nor exercised collective influence.  
The situation in the World Trade Organization is different. India and Brazil have been 
long standing advocates of developing countries in the WTO. China has a low profile 
possibly because of its recent accession. South Africa is not quite part of the strategic 
alliance among developing countries. But India and Brazil, along with United States and 
the European Union, are now members of the Quad which is the principal institutional 
mechanism for resolving differences and finding solutions.  
In conclusion, it would seem that China, India, Brazil and South Africa have a 
considerable potential for articulating a collective voice in the world of multilateralism. 
Coordination and cooperation among them carries a significant potential for exercising 
influence on multilateral institutions, which could reshape rules and create policy space 
for countries that are latecomers to development. Such coordination and cooperation, 
which is in the realm of the possible, has not yet surfaced. There could be two reasons 
for the near absence of coordination and cooperation so far. For one, in the early stages 
of change, these countries might not have recognized their potential for exercising 
collective influence. For another, their relationship with each other may be 
characterized more by rivalry, economic or political, and less by unity. It is obviously 
difficult to predict how reality might unfold in times to come. Even so, it is important to 
recognize that once these countries become major players, there is a danger that they 
might opt for the pursuit of national interest rather than the spirit of solidarity among 
developing countries or the logic of collective action.  
 
                                                 
39 For a detailed discussion on the possibilities of reform and change in these multilateral institutions, in 
the wider context of global governance, see Nayyar (2002a) 
40 There is, perhaps, a modest beginning in the G-20, where India, Brazil and South Africa, with some 
participation from China, have made an attempt to coordinate their stance on reform and change in the 
IMF. But this is no more than a beginning. It has not influenced, let alone shaped, outcomes. 27 
References 
Freeman, R .B. (2005). ‘What Really Ails Europe and America: the Doubling of the 
Global Workforce’. The Globalist, 3 June. 
Inter-American Development Bank (2005). The Emergence of China: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington DC: IADB. 
Jenkins, R., E. D. Peters, and M. M. Moreira (2008). ‘The Impact of China on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. World Development, 36 (2): 235-53. 
Kaplinsky, R. (ed.) (2006). ‘Asian Drivers: Opportunities and Threats’. IDS Bulletin, 37 
(1). 
Kaplinsky, R., and D. Messner (2008). ‘The Impact of the Asian Drivers on the 
Developing World’. World Development, 36 (2): 197-209. 
Kaplinsky, R., and M. Morris (2008). ‘Do the Asian Drivers Undermine Export-oriented 
Industrialization in SSA?’. World Development, 36 (2): 254-73. 
Krugman, P. (1994). ‘Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession’. Foreign Affairs, 73 
(March-April): 28-44. 
Lewis, W. A. (1977). The Evolution of the International Economic Order. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Maddison, A. (2003). The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD 
Nayyar, D. (1994). Migration, Remittances and Capital Flows: The Indian Experience. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Nayyar, D. (1996). ‘Free Trade: Why, When and for Whom?’. Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, XLIX (198): 333-50. 
Nayyar, D. (2002). ‘Cross-Border Movements of People’. In D. Nayyar (ed.), 
Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
for UNU-WIDER. 
Nayyar, D. (2002a). ‘The Existing System and the Missing Institutions’. In D. Nayyar 
(ed.), Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for UNU-WIDER. 
Nayyar, D. (2006). ‘Globalization, History and Development: A Tale of Two 
Centuries’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30 (1): 137-59. 
Nayyar, D. (2008). ‘The Internationalization of Firms from India: Investment, Mergers 
and Acquisitions’. Oxford Development Studies, 36 (1): 111-31. 
Nayyar, D. (2008a). ‘The Rise of China and India: Implications for Developing 
Countries’. In P. Artesis and J. Eatwell (eds), Issues in Economic Development and 
Globalization. London: Palgrave, forthcoming. 
Nayyar, D. (2008b). ‘Learning to Unlearn from Development’. Oxford Development 
Studies, 36 (3). 
Nayyar, D. (2008c). ‘International Migration and Economic Development’. In J. Stiglitz 
and N. Serra (eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New 
Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 28 
O’Neill, J., S. Lawson, D. Wilson, R. Purushothamn, M. Buchanan, and L. Griffiths 
(2004). Growth and Development: The Path to 2050. London: Goldman Sachs. 
Rowthorn, R. (2006). ‘The Renaissance of China and India: Implications for the 
Advanced Economies’. UNCTAD Discussion Paper 182. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Singh, A. (2007). ‘Globalization, Industrial Revolutions in India and China and Labour 
Markets in Advanced Countries: Implications for National and International 
Economic Policy. ILO Working Paper 81. Geneva: Policy Integration Department, 
ILO. 
Solimano, A. (2005). ‘Remittances by Emigrants: Issues and Evidence’. In 
A. B. Atkinson  (ed.), New Sources of Development Finance Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for UNU-WIDER. 
Tinker, H. (1974). A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas: 
1830-1920. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Toye, J. (2008). ‘China’s Impact on Sub-Saharan African Development: Trade, Aid and 
Politics’. In P. Artesis and J. Eatwell (eds), Issues in Economic Development and 
Globalization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
United Nations (2006). Diverging Growth and Development,  World Economic and 
Social Survey 2006. New York: United Nations. 
United Nations (2006a). National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. New York: 
UN-DESA Department of Economic and Social Affair. Available at: 
www.unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp 
United Nations (2006b). Demographic Yearbook System. New York: UN-DESA. 
Department of Economic and Social Affair. Available at www.unstats.un.org/unsd/ 
demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm 
Wilson, D., and R. Purushothaman (2004). ‘Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050’. 
in O’Neill et al. (eds), Growth and Development: The Path to 2050. London: 
Goldman Sachs, chapter 2. 
World Bank (2007). World Development Indicators 2007. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 